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Recognizing the need to extend aircraft service lives, Naval Air Systems 
Command developed the Integrated Maintenance Concept (IMC).  IMC was seen as an 
opportunity to integrate tasks over all levels of maintenance and balance the operational, 
engineering, and fiscal aspects of an aircraft’s preventative maintenance program.   
Implementation of IMC has resulted in several unintended consequences, most 
importantly degraded readiness.  Aircraft rebuild and in-process work required of 
squadron personnel interrupt maintenance at the squadrons and work stoppages interrupt 
flow at the depot.  The result is wider variability in both processes, increasing inventory 
at the depot and squadron workloads, degrading operational availability by limiting 
aircraft inventory and interrupting production at the squadron. 
The authors built a simulation model using Arena software to test the hypothesis 
that assigning organizational-level tasks to depot personnel would reduce variability in 
the process, and thereby decrease cycle times and depot work-in-process inventory.  We 
concluded that implementing our project at a cost of $1.4 million per year would be 
equivalent to having six additional aircraft, which implies savings of between $36 million 
and $150 million.  Additionally, we concluded that the squadron labor freed from 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
We will apply the integrated maintenance concept (a proactive, 
preventative maintenance process that improves reliability and availability 
of systems) to all tactical, non-commercially supported product lines, and 
will fully implement reliability centered maintenance to reduce 
maintenance demand. 
  Naval Air Systems Command Strategic Plan 2000-2005 
A. BACKGROUND  
In the age of Defense Transformation, all agencies have been forced to look 
within themselves to find ways to sustain operations while maintaining high levels of 
material readiness.  New funding is scarce and current aircraft must be maintained in 
order to last for many years into the future.  In recognition of the need to extend the lives 
of numerous Type/Model/Series (T/M/S) aircraft, the Naval Air Systems Command 
(NAVAIRSYSCOM) developed the Integrated Maintenance Concept (IMC).  
The Integrated Maintenance Concept was introduced in April 2000, calling for 
certain aircraft programs to transition to fixed operational service periods using 
Reliability Centered Maintenance analysis as a planning base for sustained maintenance.  
NAVAIRSYSCOM believed that by following the best commercial and industrial 
practices aircraft material conditions would improve, preserving numerous national 
assets.  IMC was seen as an opportunity to integrate tasks over all levels of maintenance 
and to balance the operational, engineering, and fiscal aspects of an aircraft’s 
preventative maintenance program.  (Lockard, 2000)   
The H-60 Helicopter has been in the Navy’s arsenal since the 1980’s.  Numerous 
variants have been developed and fielded making it the primary logistics, search and 
rescue, and anti-submarine warfare helicopter in the Navy.  The H-60 was one of the 
aircraft included in the integrated maintenance concept, beginning in 2002.  Overall, the 
program has been beneficial for longevity of aircraft, but issues have been identified in 
the program’s execution, primarily in aircraft preparation prior to Integrated Maintenance 
Plan (IMP) induction and aircraft rebuild following IMP maintenance. 
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Under the H-60 IMP, individual squadrons are required to prepare aircraft for 
induction into Naval Air Depots (NADEP).  After the NADEP has completed IMP 
maintenance, the aircraft is returned to the squadron, requiring squadron personnel to 
rebuild the aircraft.  It is within this period of rebuild that problems with the H-60 IMP 
have been seen. 
Rebuild time of H-60’s following the IMP process has been disturbing to 
leadership within helicopter wings, specifically the Commander, Helicopter Maritime 
Strike Wing, U.S. Pacific Fleet.  In CHSMWP alone, rebuild times have averaged at 49 
days, four days longer than the NADEP North Island requires to complete the Planned 
Maintenance Interval (PMI) process.  At any given time, there is an average of nine 
aircraft undergoing this squadron rebuilding, causing the wing to miss readiness goals by 
approximately seven aircraft.  (Venable, 2005)    
Numerous questions are raised by these findings: 
1.  Why do squadrons perform the preparation and rebuild? 
2.  Why does the squadron take so long to rebuild an aircraft? 
3.  Can the depot perform these functions faster and what is the cost? 
4.  Will having the depot perform these functions increase readiness? 
This project will answer these questions. 
 
B. AREA OF RESEARCH 
Our project will examine the Navy’s H-60 IMP.  Our first goal is to show that 
NADEPs can perform all functions of the IMP faster than sharing responsibilities with 
individual squadrons.  Our second goal is to show that operational readiness will be 
increased by the over all reduction of IMP cycle time. 
 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In order to achieve our goals, we will answer the following questions: 
1.  Why do squadrons perform the preparation and rebuild? 
2.  Why does the squadron take so long to rebuild an aircraft? 
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3.  Can the depot perform these functions faster and what is the cost? 
4.  Will having the depot perform these functions increase readiness? 
 
D. METHODOLOGY 
This project will use simulation models to meet our objectives and demonstrate 
that NADEPs can complete all aspects of IMP, reducing overall cycle time and 
improving operational availability.  We will first conduct a thorough review of the 
current H-60 IMP procedures.  The baseline model will represent these current 
procedures.   
The simulation models will be based upon information obtained from NADEP 
North Island and CHSMWP, both located in San Diego, CA.  The focus will remain on 
these organizations because of proximity and clarity of data.  Other H-60 wings and 
repair facilities will not be addressed in this thesis. 
Utilizing this data, we will construct a baseline simulation.  This simulation will 
be created in the Arena 7.0 simulation software package.  The baseline simulation will be 
a representation of the current H-60 IMP.  Our second simulation will represent an IMP 
in which the NADEP conducts preparation, IMP processing, and rebuild. 
Upon completion of the simulations, we will analyze the results and determine the 
affects of an updated IMP on H-60 readiness.   
 
E. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
The project will be structured into five chapters.  Chapter I has provided a broad 
overview of the thesis subject, stated the objective of the thesis, identified research 
questions, described the scope of our research effort and presented our research 
methodology.  Chapter II discusses the H-60 IMP in detail, showing procedures and 
methodology.  Chapter III will present the ARENA simulation model of the current H-60 
IMP for NADEP North Island and HSM Wing Pacific.  Chapter IV will present a 
comparative analysis of our proposed H-60 IMP against the baseline simulation model of 
the current H-60 IMP.  Chapter V presents a summary of our project research, 





















II. THE H-60 INTEGRATED MAINTENANCE PLAN 
A. BACKGROUND 
The H-60 IMP was first implemented on August 1, 2002, in compliance with 
NAVAIRSYSCOM’s IMC.  One revision has been made since the IMP was developed.  
This thesis will outline the January 1, 2005, revision of the H-60 IMP.  This overview 
will be very brief and the extreme details of the H-60 IMP can be found in the NAVAIR 
H-60B/F/H IMP Instruction. 
 
B. THE IMP PROCESS 
 
1. IMP Scope 
The H-60 IMP mandates four separate, Planned Maintenance Interval (PMI) 
airframe and component inspections, system operability checks, deficiency identification, 
correction, and preventive maintenance to provide aircraft serviceability through the next 
planned corrective maintenance interval.  The requirements within the IMP are the 
minimum requirements necessary to ensure that aircraft undergoing the process are 
operationally available during the established, fixed service period.  These processes are 
to be adequate to aircraft safety requirements and take into account reasonable economic 
considerations. (Coley, 2005) 
Aircraft that have gone more than four years since its last Standard Depot Level 
Maintenance (SDLM) or Service Tour Extension Process (STEP) are required to undergo 
restorative maintenance in what the IMP describes as an IMP Baseline inspection prior to 
entering the IMP PMI cycle.  This baseline is accomplished by undergoing PMI One 
through PMI Four concurrently.  (Coley, 2005) The individual PMI levels will be 
detailed later.  Aircraft with two years or less since its last SDLM are entered into the 
PMI cycle with PMI One.  H-60’s with greater than two years and less than four years 
since SDLM are inducted into the PMI cycle with PMI Two and Aircraft with two years 
or less since STEP will enter PMI One. (Coley, 2005) Figure 1 shows the induction 
matrix for the H-60 IMP. 
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Table 1. IMP Induction Matrix (Coley, 2005) 
 
2. IMP Intervals 
All H-60 T/M/S have been placed on a 96 month cycle with PMI Inspections 
occurring at the end of each Planned Operational Interval (POI) of 24 months. (Coley, 
2005)  This POI is currently being revised to a 36 month cycle, but that cycle length will 
not be examined by this thesis.  To date, only three aircraft have undergone the new 
procedures, limiting the amount of data available.  The data utilized in the ARENA 
model will be based upon the 24 month cycle.  The following figure illustrates the POI 
for the H-60: 
 




3. Planned Maintenance Intervals Description 
The intervals conducted by NADEPs are PMI’s One, Two, Three, Four, and the 
Baseline.  Under the new plan, there are two PMI’s, PMI One N and Two N.  Again, 
since only three aircraft have undergone the new process, there is not enough data to 
analyze, so this thesis will only focus on the old PMI processes.   
For the purposes of PMI, the aircraft is separated into six zones.  Figure 3 shows 
how the aircraft is divided. 
 
Figure 2. IMP Zone Descriptions (Coley, 2005) 
 
Each zone is an area that is inspected during the PMI process and discrepancies 
corrected.  The four levels of PMI inspect different zones, with the exception of the 
Baseline which examines all zones of the aircraft. (Brambila, 2005)  Table 1 shows which 
zones are inspected by which PMI.  The Baseline will be excluded from this table since 
all zones are affected by the Baseline. 
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Zone Inspected PMI
One Two and Four
Two All PMI's
Three Two and Four
Four Four
Five Two and Four
Six Four  
Table 2. Zones Affected By PMI (Coley, 2005) 
 
During PMI, the aircraft undergoes extensive structural inspections.  As illustrated 
in the zone breakdown, every system of the aircraft is inspected over a four year period.  
If discrepancies are discovered during the process of PMI inspections, the discrepancy is 
corrected by the depot team. (Brambila, 2005) 
The PMI process takes approximately 45 days to complete.  The 45 days is based 
upon the man hours that the depot charges NAVAIRSYSCOM.  If an aircraft is taking 
less than 45 days to complete, personnel are moved to higher priority aircraft or other 
aircraft that are in an earlier phase of PMI.  Switching the man power requirements 
causes all aircraft to be in the depot for approximately 45 days. (Brambila, 2005) 
 
4. Squadron Requirements 
During the development of the H-60 IMP, it was decided by NAVAIRSYSCOM 
that the individual squadrons would prepare the aircraft for induction into PMI.  This 
preparation was above and beyond typical aircraft preparations, such as aircraft washes, 
special inspections, and equipment inventories.  It was decided that major components, 
such as rotor blades, and sound proofing, would be removed.  A full explanation of this 
preparation can be found in the NAVAIRSYSCOM Maintenance Requirement Card A1-
H60CA-MRC-350. (Coley, 2005) The disassembly performed prior to IMP induction 
renders the aircraft Non-Mission Capable (NMC) or not able to fly.  This disassembly 
time averages to about three days for CHSMWP. (Venable, 2005) 
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Upon completion of work by NADEP, squadrons receive the aircraft in a NMC 
status.  Figures 4, 5, and 6 are examples of an aircraft that is ready for acceptance by the 
squadron. 
 
Figure 4. H-60 Ready for Squadron Acceptance (Sullivan, 2005) 
 
 




Figure 6. H-60 Ready for Squadron Acceptance (Sullivan, 2005) 
 
The pictures clearly show that the aircraft is not ready to fly.  After acceptance, the 
aircraft becomes a very low priority for the squadron and is at high risk of 
cannibalization.  Squadrons in HSM Wing Pacific have average rebuild times of 49 days 
per aircraft.  Some take as few as three days where two squadrons took over 200 days to 
rebuild aircraft.  The standard deviation of this data exceeds that of the mean, showing 
great variability within the rebuild process.  On average, there are nine aircraft 
undergoing the rebuild process at any given time in HSM Wing Pacific which misses 
ready for tasking goals by seven aircraft. (Venable, 2005) 
The decision to have squadrons rebuild aircraft was based upon the cost of depot 
labor.  According to Mr. Victor Brambila, H-60 Project Manager at NADEP North 
Island, the depot can do the preparation and rebuild of the aircraft.  Mr. Brambila stated 
that he would prefer to have the depot complete the preparation and rebuild because of 
work stoppages that are encountered if a step in preparation is missed and squadron 
personnel are required to come to the depot to do the work.  Mr. Brambila’s workers are 
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not authorized to do any work missed by the squadron because the depot is not funded to 
complete any preparation tasks. (Brambila, 2005)   
NAVAIRSYSCOM completed an extensive Business Cost Analysis to determine 
if this was the best way to save money.  The results of the BCA are deemed “Business 
Sensitive” by NAVAIRSYSCOM and can be obtained from Program Manager Air-299, 
but in order to keep this report unclassified and to have distribution unlimited, the results 
are not included.  It will be stated that squadrons are rebuilding aircraft to save money in 
labor costs. (Cook, 2005) 
 
C. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
The H-60 Integrated Maintenance Plan is a good concept that has a major 
discrepancy; it creates variability by having two work forces, the squadron and the depot, 
with differing priorities working together.  The differing priorities are natural, the depot 
wants to complete the IMP and the squadron is focused on flying aircraft.  Though it 
saves money, this concept is hurting Navy readiness.   
Cost has become the driving factor in many decisions made in designing the IMP.  
Analyzing this plan with a “bottom-line” mentality of dollars may help the Navy stay in 
budget, but this mentality is hurting the “bottom-line” of readiness.  If the Navy invested 
money in having the depot complete 100% of the IMP for the H-60, or Full Mission 
Capable (FMC) in, FMC out, readiness will improve.  Having all the cost savings in the 
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IV. OUR SIMULATION MODEL 
A. OVERVIEW OF MODELING AND SIMULATION 
1. What is Modeling  and Simulation? 
Modeling and simulation is “a broad collection of methods and applications to 
mimic the behavior of real systems, usually on a computer with appropriate software…” 
as described by David Kelton, Randall Sadowski, and David Sturrock in the book 
Simulation with Arena: Third Edition.  A real system, as defined by Kelton, is an actual 
or planned facility or process. (Kelton et al., 2004) 
Les Oakshott of the University of the West of England, Bristol, describes 
modeling in his book Business Modeling and Simulation.  “A model is a simplified 
representation of a system, where a system refers to any collection of objects or processes 
that interact in some way.” (Oakshott, 1997)  Our model utilizes the Arena simulation 
software to represent the processes involved in the IMP of the H-60, showing how the 
squadron and the depot interact in order to return a helicopter to FMC status.   
2. Steps in Developing a Simulation Project 
A successful simulation project requires certain steps, however there is no formal 
procedure to follow.  Eleven general steps will be followed in order to develop the H-60 
simulation model.  These general steps will come from Les Oakshott, but items referring 
to the development of Arena specific issues will come from Kelton, Sadowski, and 
Sturrock. 
 
• Formulate the Problem and Plan the Study 
• Collect and Analyze the Data 
• Build the Conceptual Model 
• Check the Validity of the Conceptual Model 
• Develop the Computer Model 
• Verify (or Debug) the Computer Model 
• Validate the Model 
• Design Experiments 
• Make Production Runs 
• Analyze Output Data 
• Write the Report and Make Recommendations 
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We will now describe the Arena model of the H-60 IMP in detail. 
 
B. ASSUMPTIONS 
It would likely be impossible, and unnecessary, to model any complex process 
with absolute precision using software-based simulation tools.  In fact, to attempt to do so 
would not only waste time but also defeat the purpose of simulation: to enable better-
informed decisions with less investment in time.  Therefore, in building models, 
assumptions are inevitable and indispensable. 
The H-60 depot maintenance process is too complicated to model with absolute 
precision, so we have made several assumptions: 
1. Inductions occur randomly. 
In reality, depot inductions are not random, but scheduled well ahead of time, so 
that both squadrons and the depot can make appropriate decisions regarding allocation of 
resources.  However, because our simulation runs for ten years per replication, it would 
be impractical to build a schedule for that period of time.  Therefore, we collected and 
analyzed data obtained from NADEP North Island (NADEPNI) which showed that, for 
the two-year period between July 2003 and July 2005, the depot inducted an average of 
59 aircraft per year.  Because there was no particular pattern discerned regarding the 
amount of time between inductions of helicopters at the depot, we have used a uniformly 
distributed random variable to simulate the time between arrivals. 
2. The type of induction is randomly determined. 
As in the first assumption, in reality, not only the date of arrival is known well 
ahead of time, but also the type of induction, and again, we chose not to build a schedule 
for a ten-year period, but instead to utilize a discrete random variable to assign the type of 
PMI interval to each helicopter as it arrives. 
3. Only teams of three artisans can be employed to work on helicopters. 
If a helicopter were to arrive at the depot and four idle artisans were available to 
work, the system would assign only three artisans to that aircraft.  If, on the other hand, a 
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helicopter were to arrive into the system and only two artisans were available, the aircraft 
would wait in a queue until a third artisan was available for assignment. 
Neither of the above situations is likely to occur in our simulation, however, since 
there are sixty (3×20) personnel available on day shift, and fifteen (3×5) on night shift.  
The significant drawback to this assumption is that we are unable to simulate assignment 
of artisans, either idle or working on lower priority aircraft, to aircraft of higher priority.  
In reality, if an aircraft is approaching its due date, it receives more attention than aircraft 
with later due dates, and may be assigned as many as six artisans working 
simultaneously.  We have simulated the assignment of priority by closest due date, but 
this priority comes into play only once in the simulation, when the aircraft arrives in the 
queue and attempts to seize artisans for the first time. 
Although this does not faithfully simulate the actual resource assignment process, 
Arena does not provide a straightforward method for duplicating the real process, so we 
have assumed that, on average, when a helicopter is being worked on, there are three 
artisans working simultaneously.  This was necessary in order for the model of the status 
quo system to achieve the observed throughput of the actual system with comparable 
cycle times and in-process inventories. 
4. Teams assigned to an aircraft work continuously until completion. 
Production capacity in our model is similar to that in the real system: sixty 
personnel work an eight-hour day shift, fifteen work the eight-hour night shift.  As in the 
actual system, there is no third-shift capacity and no capacity on weekends.  Unlike the 
real system, however, we have not made provisions for overtime or holidays, whose 
effects would tend to cancel the other’s out. 
Because of a quirk in Arena, we have had to design the simulation to work each 
team continuously until its assigned aircraft has been completed; at that point, the team 
becomes unavailable while it takes all of time-off it has accumulated at once.  This is 
known as the Wait option of the Arena Schedule Rule, and has the same overall effect on 
capacity and queue waiting time as teams taking time off as scheduled (see Kelton et al., 
pp. 123-124), except on the initial inductions.  To counteract the initial effect on queue  
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wait times (the first twenty inductions would have close to zero wait times, for example), 
we have built a warm-up period of 1,000 days into the simulation, for which period no 
data are collected. 
A note on our naming convention: we have named all four observed PMI events 
by number (PMI 1, PMI 2, PMI 3, and PMI 4).  However, NADEPNI did not have any 
data on PMI 4 cycle times or labor hours, but they did have data on PMI Baseline events.  
These events are similar in length and process to PMI 4, but they are not identical; 
however, we felt that for ease of discussion, we would keep to a standard nomenclature.  
Throughout this paper, we will refer to all PMI Baseline data as PMI 4. 
 
C. SIMULATION COMMENCEMENT 
The simulation begins with the creation of the first entity, an H-60 helicopter, at 
time zero.  Subsequent entities are generated at random intervals based on analysis of 
historical data.  The data show that, in a 104-week period, 119 helicopters were inducted 
into the IMC process at NADEPNI.  This translates into 1.14 inductions per week, which 
equals an average of 6.1 days between inductions.  To simulate that interval, we have 
used a uniformly distributed random variable with a minimum of 0.2 days and a 
maximum of 12 days. 
The program then randomly assigns an induction type to the entity.  The 
assignment is based on the historical data, from which we determined the actual 
proportion of total inductions for each type of induction.  For example, historical data 
show that PMI 1 inductions represented approximately 35% of all H-60 PMI inductions 
into NADEPNI; therefore, in our model, there is a 35% chance that a newly-created 
entity will be assigned to the PMI 1 process.  Likewise, the chances of the model 
assigning an entity to the PMI 2, PMI 3, and PMI 4 processes are 35%, 20%, and 10%, 
respectively. 
Next, based on its assigned induction type, each entity is assigned a value 
representing the total number of man-hours which will be required to complete its depot 
maintenance process.  In reality, when each helicopter arrives at the depot, this value has 
been largely predetermined based on its past operating conditions, but of course the exact 
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value can’t be known.  In the case of this simulation, we utilize four random variables 
(one for each PMI process) with triangular distributions to assign this value at the outset.  
The minimum values, modes, and maximum values of the distributions have again been 
determined by analysis of NADEP North Island historical data, and are displayed in 
Table 3. 
Minimum Mode Maximum
PMI 1 650 1200 2000
PMI 2 1600 3000 4400
PMI 3 800 1200 2000
PMI 4 4000 5800 7200  
Table 3. NADEPNI Historical Data 
At this point in the simulation, all of the attributes unique to each entity have been 
assigned: its time of arrival into the system, the type of depot process which it will 
undergo, and the amount of time that process will take to complete.  The entity is then 
cloned, so that it can be simultaneously inducted into both the PMI process as it exists 
currently and our proposed system.  In this way, the status quo can be directly compared 
to our proposed alternative process. 
 
D. SIMULATION OF STATUS QUO 
Now that the entity has been cloned, it enters our model of the PMI process as 
that process exists currently.  The first step represents the organizational-level squadron’s 
work to prepare the aircraft for induction.  It is at this point in the actual process that the 
aircraft is first considered to be NMC, so it is at this point in the simulation that we 
increase the variable NMCsq by one (“sq” for status quo).  We have only anecdotal data 
on which to base our model of this first step, but we found unanimity from polled 
squadrons that three days’ time is sufficient to complete the preparation, so we have 
simulated this step with a delay of three days. 
Upon completion of the aircraft preparation process, the squadron delivers the 
helicopter to the depot; the depot then promises to have the process completed on a 
specific future date.  This promise date is based on corporate knowledge of the number of 
work-days a “typical” aircraft undergoing a specific process will require.  We assign a 
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promise date within the model using the same estimates, and for much the same reason 
that the depot does: to determine which aircraft currently in-process have higher priority 
for assignment of personnel.  NADEPNI assigns higher priority to an aircraft promised 
for return next week, for example, than to one which arrived earlier than that 
aforementioned aircraft but whose promise date is still several weeks away.  Since 
NADEPNI does not use the “First-In-First-Out” (FIFO) rule to determine priority for 
assignment of personnel to work on an aircraft, neither do we use it in the model. 
However, in our model, as at NADEPNI, we do use the FIFO rule for assignment 
of aircraft parking spots.  Since there are finite numbers of parking spots at NADEPNI, 
we limit the resource (parking spots) within the model to 25, and as common sense would 
dictate, we assign each helicopter a parking spot as soon as it arrives, regardless of its 
promise date.  It is at this point in the model that we also increase our second variable, 
NMCsqD (“D” for depot-only time), by one.  This variable will be used to validate the 
model’s accuracy by tracking work-in-process (WIP) inventory at the depot for 
comparison to historical data. 
Since depot artisans cannot work on two aircraft simultaneously, in our model, we 
limit the availability of artisans according to actual shift schedules.  As discussed above 
in our description of assumptions, our model does not precisely mimic the actual process 
in assigning artisans, but the simulation will still provide accurate results for analysis.  As 
each new aircraft enters the queue for the next available team of artisans, its place in line 
is determined by the promise date assigned earlier in the process.  Those entities with the 
nearest due-dates are moved to the head of the queue.  The effect is that aircraft 
accumulate all of their queue-waiting time at the outset, whereas in reality, a new queue 
forms at the beginning of each shift. 
Upon successful seizure of a team of three artisans, the aircraft is delayed an 
amount of time equal to one-third of the total time to be spent within the process, as 
assigned upon creation of the entity.  Since that time is assigned in man-hours, and there 
will always be exactly three artisans working on the aircraft, simulation process time—
the “delay time”, in Arena syntax—is one-third of the assigned time.  After the 
appropriate delay, the artisans working on the aircraft are released and take all of their 
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accumulated time off before becoming available for assignment to other entities that may 
be waiting in the queue.  However, there is one hurdle still remaining before the aircraft 
can be returned to the squadron and its parking spot at the depot reassigned. 
There are multiple aircraft discrepancies which may be discovered only after 
induction, once the depot inspection process has begun.  In several of these cases, depot 
artisans must stop work once the discrepancy is discovered because, according to the 
IMC specification, the preparatory work must be done by organizational-level personnel.  
This requirement obviously induces delays in the processing of affected aircraft, though 
without tying up depot artisans.  We have simulated this situation by delaying half of the 
aircraft an additional three days, again based only on anecdotal information, as provided 
by NADEPNI.  The parking spot is then released for reassignment, the variable NMCsqD 
is reduced by one, and cycle time data are collected by process type for validation of the 
model’s accuracy. 
After the actual depot process has ended, however, the aircraft still has a long way 
to go before it is Ready For Tasking (RFT).  Similar to the IMC specifications for 
organizational-level preparation for induction and organizational-level in-process 
preparation for correction of certain discrepancies, there is also a specification for 
organizational-level rebuild of aircraft following depot maintenance.  Because this 
specification requires a significant investment of man-hours, and because squadron 
manpower is focused on maintenance required to meet the significant demands of the 
flight schedules for the current day or week, often aircraft returned from the depot do not 
reach RFT status for several weeks.  We have simulated this fact with a further delay, 
based on historical data provided by CHSMWP.  (We chose not to combine the data with 
other Wing commanders’ data, since policies, procedures, and management styles have a 
significant effect on rebuild time and vary across Type Wings.)  Finally, the variable 
NMCsq is reduced by one and additional cycle time data are collected. 
 
E. SIMULATION OF PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE PROCESS 
Concurrent with the entity entering the status quo process, its clone enters a model 
of our proposed alternative process.  As in the status quo process, the first step is again 
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squadron preparation of the aircraft; however, in our proposed process, we are 
recommending that at least some of the preparatory work be performed by depot artisans 
rather than organizational-level personnel.  Therefore, we have simulated a delay of two 
days, saving one day of processing time as compared to the status quo, a conservative 
estimate in our opinion.  Commencement of the process is captured, similar to above, by 
increasing the value of the variable NMCalt (non-mission capable, alternative process) by 
one. 
Assignment of promise dates, priorities, helicopter parking spots, and artisans is 
done in processes separate from but identical to the processes in the status quo model.  
Because we are not modeling our proposed system on an existing system, we will not be 
validating this part of the model, and therefore we will not create a variable analogous to 
NMCsqD or collect the mid-process data that we collected in the status quo model. 
The PMI process in our proposed process model is similar to the analogous 
process in the status quo model, with the exception being that 300 man-hours are added 
to each entity’s required total processing time as assigned at creation.  This figure 
represents the estimated additional labor required of the depot artisans in order to relieve 
the squadrons of some of the preparatory work and most of the rebuild work as currently 
defined in the IMC specification.  As above, artisans are assigned in teams of three, and 
therefore the total process time in man-hours is divided by three to obtain total simulation 
time required for the PMI delay.  Once the parking spot is released, the variable NMCalt 
















V. SIMULATION RESULTS 
A. MODEL VALIDATION 
In order to validate the accuracy of our model, we ran our simulation for a period 
of ten years, with warm-up periods of 1,000 days to bring the system to equilibrium 
before collecting data.  This process was repeated for a total of thirty independent trials, 
and the results were averaged.  We collected data on the aircraft at specific points during 
the simulation which correspond to endpoints in the real system for which historical data 
are available.  Because we have based our status quo model on the existing system at 
NADEPNI, we would expect to obtain results which closely match the actual data 
collected from the real process at the depot.  Conversely, if we have made inappropriate 
assumptions, we would expect to obtain results significantly different from those 
observed in the actual system. 
1. Cycle Times 
We collected cycle time data at the point in the status quo model when the aircraft 
completed its depot-level process and was returned to the squadron.  Because this cycle 
time interval began at creation of the entity, it includes the three days spent in preparation 
at the squadron; therefore, to compare our results to those obtained by NADEPNI, we 
must first subtract those three days or 72 hours from the cycle time.  As can be seen in 
Table 4, considering the assumptions that we had to make, our results closely match those 
observed at NADEPNI. 


















PMI 1 1,683 65 -72 67 57
PMI 2 2,456 81 -72 99 90
PMI 3 1,654 55 -72 66 66
PMI 4 3,597 183 -72 147 168  







2. Work-in-Process Inventories 
The variable NMCsqD kept track of the work-in-process (WIP) inventory during 
our simulation.  Arena analyzed NMCsqD as a time-persistent variable, and the results 
closely matched those observed at NADEPNI from January 2003 through January 2005, 
as seen in Table 5. 












Avg Yearly Throughput  
Table 5. Work In Process Comparison 
 
3. Inductions and Throughput 
Our model averaged only 435 aircraft inducted per ten-year replication, for an 
average of approximately 44 aircraft inducted per year.  In comparison, NADEPNI 
inducted 119 aircraft in a two-year period, for an average of nearly sixty aircraft per year.  
The throughput rates compared similarly: our model averaged only 43 aircraft completed 
per year, while NADEPNI averaged 58 (see Table 5). 
 
B. PROPOSED SYSTEM VERSUS STATUS QUO 
The only measurement that really matters in naval aviation is total number of 
aircraft ready-for-tasking (RFT).  By defining the length of the IMC cycle as the total 
amount of time an aircraft remains NMC as a result, directly or indirectly, of the PMI 
process, we can directly measure the effect of that process on readiness.  In this 
comparison, therefore, we include the time required to rebuild aircraft upon completion 
of the PMI process. 
1. Cycle Times 
In order to capture the entire interval during which aircraft are NMC, in the model 
of the process as it currently exists, we collected data for analysis at the point where the 
squadron finishes rebuilding the aircraft.  Since our proposed process includes rebuilding 
the aircraft prior to their return to the squadron, it is at that point that we collect the data. 
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As can be seen from Table 6, in the case of each PMI process, our proposed 
model demonstrates a significant improvement in cycle times over the current process. 



















PMI 1 119 3 78 3 41
PMI 2 151 4 112 4 39
PMI 3 118 4 79 3 39
PMI 4 199 8 168 9 31  
Table 6. Proposal NMC Time 
 
2. Work-in-Process Inventories 
Over the course of the simulation runs, the variables NMCsq and NMCalt kept 
track of the work-in-process inventories held in the model of the status quo system and 
our proposed system, respectively.  These variables were analyzed over time, and the 
time-persistent averages were calculated by Arena.  Table 7 displays the reduction in 
work-in-process inventory achieved by our proposed model in comparison to the model 
of the status quo. 










22.5 0.6 16.2 0.7 6.3  
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VI. CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND AREAS FOR 
FURTHER RESEARCH 
This chapter will present our project conclusions, recommendations, and 
recommended areas for further research.  The questions posed in Chapter I have been 
answered through the text, so the conclusions and recommendations below are displayed 
in a “bottom-line” fashion.  Each conclusion will be immediately followed by 
recommended courses of action.  The recommended areas of further research are 
presented as opportunities to validate this project. 
 
A. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. The process modeled in Arena which represents the status quo is an 
accurate representation of the depot process at NADEP North Island.  The results of the 
simulation runs, when compared to historical cycle-time and WIP data from NADEP, 
provide sufficient evidence to reach this conclusion. 
We recommend that the Arena model developed for NADEPNI be applied to 
NADEP Jacksonville and the East Coast H-60 community.  By applying the model to a 
separate, but similar entity it can be proven that our results are repeatable.  We believe 
that this model can be applied to multiple aircraft communities 
2. Changing the PMI process to assign tasks currently undertaken by 
organizational-level activities (aircraft preparation, certain in-process tasks, and aircraft 
rebuild) to depot personnel will reduce total cycle time for the PMI processes by four to 
six weeks.  Because aircraft within the process are NMC, these reductions in cycle times 
will effectively increase the inventory of available aircraft by approximately six.  We 
base this conclusion on the simulation results, as well as the fact that the cycle time 
reductions were accompanied by a proportional reduction in WIP, as predicted by Little’s 
Law. (Little, 1961) 
We recommend assignment of all tasks associated with the PMI process to depot-
level personnel.  Doing so will reduce the wide variability that exists within the current 
process, thereby reducing cycle times and work-in-process inventories.  By decreasing 
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WIP inventories at the depot, flight-line inventories increase; by freeing up sailor labor 
currently allocated to performing PMI process tasks, the operational readiness of those 
flight line inventories can be improved. 
3. We estimate that, under the old PMI schedule, our proposal would cost 
less than $1.4 million per year to implement, and would put, on average, six additional 
aircraft on the flight line every day.  Discounted over a twenty-year period at a rate of 
7%, the present value of the total cost of the project would be $14.8 million.  The result 
of implementing the project would be equivalent to having six additional aircraft, which, 
at a cost of $6 million for an SH-60B and $25 million for an SH-60R, would imply 
potential savings of between $36 million and $150 million.  Based on our estimates, we 
recommend that NAVAIRSYSCOM adopt this proposal. 
 
B. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This project has shown numerous areas in which further research may be 
beneficial.  Some suggestions include: 
1. Verify Results by Examining the East Coast 
We recommend that the Arena model developed for NADEPNI be applied to 
NADEP Jacksonville and the East Coast H-60 community.  By applying the model to a 
separate, but similar entity it can be proven that our results are repeatable.  We believe 
that this model can be applied to multiple aircraft communities.   
2. Examine the Financial Ramifications 
It is recommended that the financial ramifications of improving the efficiency of 
the Depot be analyzed.  The improved efficiency may result in a decrease in the amount 
of man hours required to complete the IMP process, possibly affecting the amount of 
money required per man hour. 
3. Apply to other Type/Model/Series Aircraft 
If the results of the ARENA model are repeatable for the East Coast, we highly 
recommend modeling the Depot Level maintenance procedures for all aircraft T/M/S 
currently in the Navy’s arsenal.  By modeling the processes, changes can be made to help 
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